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PREFACE
‘Universal Basic Services’ (UBS) is an idea that 
has captured the imaginations of people around 
the world, and with this report, the Institute for 
Global Prosperity (IGP) continues to lead the effort 
to promote a more socially orientated vision of 
the future. This is the second report of the Social 
Prosperity Knowledge Network of the IGP charged 
with developing innovative ideas upon which to 
build a sustainable welfare state that meets the 
specific challenges of the 21st Century
Supported by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
we have conducted a review of literature on 
existing public services to better understand what 
lessons can be learned from past experiences 
and the challenges we must face to bring this idea 
to fruition. The report makes it clear how much 
hard thinking and analysis remains to be done. 
It provides references to existing examples of 
universal and publicly accessible basic services, 
including descriptors that allow sorting by service 
area, type of provision, outcome and geography. 
The aim is to build a library of references regarding 
the provision and design of services, as well as 
more exploratory political and philosophical work 
around the accessibility of and justifications for 
public services.
It is one of the great strengths of UBS that it builds 
on our existing social structures, starting where  
we are now. This report provides a reference base 
that researchers and proponents can use to further 
their ideas for the expansion of existing services 
and the development of new services in areas like 
digital communications, transport and childcare.  
It explores the impact of existing public services  
and in so doing also reveals the complexities and 
inter-relations between different services.
The key take-away is that while each service area has 
unique characteristics that will require design specific 
to meeting the objectives of that service, all of the 
services feed into and support each other and result 
in a sum greater than the parts. This means that the 
quality of the democracy and the political commitment 
to the overarching goals of ensuring the safety, 
opportunity and participation of all will be determining 
factors in any UBS initiative. It also reinforces and 
makes evident that the purpose of investment in 
universal basic services is to extend and enhance 
the capabilities and capacities of individuals and 
communities, strengthening their resilience in the  
face of current and future challenges as processes  
of economic and social transformation accelerate.
We have only a short time within which to rearrange 
our systems of social support so that our societies 
conform with the narrow envelopes that define 
democratic and climate sustainability. Building on 
what we have to create fundamental change offers 
us the chance to make the needed adjustments 
in time. This report lays out the foundation we are 
building on, highlighting both strengths we can use 
and weaknesses we must address.
UBS is a simple concept based on the established 
ethos of public services that has embedded in it a 
sophisticated evolution of democratic power, social 
security, and environmental responsibility. We cannot 
shy away from the complexities and we must learn from 
our experiences, and this report is a guide to both.
With special thanks to Anna Coote from NEF and 
Pritika Kasliwal at the IGP for their work on editing 
and assembling this material, I am pleased to present 
this report as the next step in our project to make 
Universal Basic Services a concrete policy option for 
nations, regions and communities around the world.
 
PROFESSOR HENRIETTA L. MOORE 
Founder and Director 
The Institute for Global Prosperity
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This report explores the hypothesis that 
strengthening and extending universal services is 
an effective way of tackling poverty and improving 
wellbeing for all. It draws on academic literature 
including conceptual thinking, political and 
economic analysis, case studies and evaluations, 
as well as some ‘grey literature’ and factual 
reportage. The main focus is on the UK, but there 
are implications for – and lessons to be learned 
from - other countries. It builds on earlier work by 
the Institute of Global Prosperity, summarised in 
the 2017 report, Social Prosperity for the Future: a 
proposal for Universal Basic Services.1
The term ‘universal basic services’ encapsulates 
three crucial concepts. For the purposes of this 
review, we define them as follows, in reverse order.
1. Services, meaning collectively generated 
activities that serve the public interest. 
2. Basic, meaning essential and sufficient, rather 
than minimal, in that these collective activities 
enable people to meet their needs.
3. Universal, meaning that everyone is entitled to 
services that meet their needs, regardless of 
ability to pay.
Our references to ‘public services’ in the rest of this 
report should be understood in these terms. 
Central to the case for UBS is that the idea should 
be substantially developed in practice, both by 
improving the quality and reach of existing services 
such as healthcare and education, and by extending 
this approach into areas where essential services 
are not currently available to all, such as care, 
transport and information. 
Our findings are not definitive, as they are based 
on a rapid, indicative review of relevant literature. 
We hope to shed more light on the subject and 
we also expect to reveal uncertainties, questions, 
knowledge gaps, and areas for further study and 
debate.
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE:
THE RATIONALE
The term ‘universal basic services’ (UBS) was 
originally coined to signpost a policy alternative 
to ‘universal basic income’ (UBI). The latter is 
a proposal to give regular, unconditional cash 
payments to all individuals, regardless of their 
income or status. The former is a proposal to 
develop more and better collectively provided 
services that are free for all who need them, 
regardless of income or status. Both are put forward 
as ways of reducing poverty and inequality, and 
improving wellbeing for all. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider 
the case for UBI in any depth. Arguments for and 
against are well documented elsewhere.2 However, 
the case for UBS rests in part on whether improving 
and extending public services is likely to be more 
effective in addressing poverty, inequality and 
wellbeing than unconditional cash payments to 
individuals.3 
SHARED NEEDS AND COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITIES.
Two principles are fundamental to the rationale for 
UBS: shared needs and collective responsibilities. 
We all share certain basic needs that must be 
satisfied if we are to be able to survive and thrive, 
think for ourselves and participate in society. 
Theories of capability and human need converge 
around this point. Nussbaum (2006) describes three 
‘core’ capabilities: of affiliation, bodily integrity and 
practical reason. Doyal and Gough (1991) identify 
health and critical autonomy as prerequisites for 
social participation. This finds an echo in the goals 
set out by the Social Prosperity Network when it 
argued the case for UBS to achieve a ‘larger life for 
the ordinary person’4 through security, opportunity 
and participation.5
Human needs are not context specific, but 
universal across time and space. While the detail 
of how needs are met will vary widely, they always 
require certain generic ‘satisfiers’ (or ‘intermediate 
needs’) that do not vary. These were originally 
listed by need theorists as water, nutrition, shelter, 
secure and non-threatening work, education, 
healthcare, security in childhood, significant primary 
relationships, physical and economic security and 
a safe environment.6 Some argue that access to 
motorised transport and to the internet have now 
become essential for participation in society.7 
However, the latter are perhaps best understood 
as hybrid satisfiers, between specific and generic, 
because they have not always been essential but 
are increasingly felt to be so at a global level. 
The social settlement established after the Second 
World War expressed a shared resolve that 
everyone’s basic needs should be met. People 
should be able to buy certain essentials for 
themselves and – where costs outstripped most 
household budgets - services should be provided 
to all who needed them. A national consensus 
emerged that responsibility for the welfare of the 
population was a collective function, conducted by 
pooling resources and sharing risks through the 
institutions of government. Marshall (1965) summed 
up the collective approach to social welfare in the 
concept of ‘social citizenship’ based on economic 
and social (as well as civil and political) rights.8
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WHY SERVICES?
The concepts of shared needs and collective 
responsibilities beg the question of how 
responsibility should be exercised to meet needs: 
through income support or through public services 
and other forms of collective action? This is not a 
question of either/or but of the balance between 
them. 
UBS advocates generally agree that adequate 
and accessible income support is needed, but that 
this should be augmented by a ‘social wage’ or 
‘virtual income’ from collectively provided services 
that would otherwise have to be paid for out of 
individual or household budgets.
The notion of a social wage can be traced back 
many decades. RH Tawney (1964) said of public 
health and education services that ‘the standard of 
living of the great mass of the nation depends, not 
merely on the remuneration which they are paid 
for their labour, but on the social income which 
they receive as citizens’.9 More recently, there have 
been calls to recognise public services as ‘social 
infrastructure’, no less essential than highways, 
the national grid and other aspects of the ‘material 
infrastructure’ on which we all depend. It is argued 
that expenditure on both kinds of infrastructure 
should be treated as investment that will yield social 
and economic dividends.10
As this suggests, public services create value that 
is routinely underestimated and should be taken 
into account. But we are not talking here about 
economic value alone. Our analysis suggests that 
the value of services can be understood across four 
dimensions: 
Equity: services have a strong redistributive effect, 
as they are worth much more to people on low 
incomes than to those who are better off.
Efficiency: services deal with market failures and 
achieve economies of scale.
Solidarity: services are a manifestation of shared 
interest and purpose; they can help to bring people 
together and build social cohesion.
Sustainability: services can produce benefits that 
are continuous and cumulative; they are organised 
in ways that can facilitate carbon reduction, respond 
to climate hazards and achieve longer-term 
environmental sustainability. 
A great deal depends on how services are 
designed, funded and delivered, and on their scope 
and quality. We explore the potential benefits of 
services in Chapter Three. First we turn to what is 
known about public services in the UK today.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE CURRENT 
LANDSCAPE
A broad public consensus in support of free 
healthcare and education has endured since the 
1940s. According to a 2017 survey for the King’s 
Fund, 77% of the public believe the NHS should be 
maintained in its current form and around 90% support 
the founding principles of the NHS (that it should meet 
the needs of everyone, be free at the point of delivery 
and based on clinical need, not ability to pay).11
A poll for the Department for Education in 
2016 found that 80% of respondents had some 
confidence in primary level state schooling, while 
28% reported having ‘a great deal’ or ‘complete’ 
confidence; 83% thought that state secondary 
schools taught basic skills such as reading, writing 
and maths ‘well’ or ‘very well’.12
While healthcare and schooling continue to embody 
the concept of ‘social citizenship’, government 
policies since 1979 have chipped away at the post 
war consensus and at the scope and quality of 
public services. They have done this by promoting 
a vision of economic success based on individual 
choice and market competition, and – since 2010 
- by cutting taxes and severely reducing public 
spending in a series of ‘austerity’ budgets. Between 
2009 and 2018, the total limit of government 
departmental expenditure (DEL) ‘fell by more than 
£45 billion, equivalent to a cut of 10.9% in real terms, 
or an average cut of 1.4% per year’.13
Schools and healthcare have suffered greatly as 
a result. So have policing and social work. Higher 
education has been largely commodified. Collective 
provision of youth services, housing, adult social 
care, rural buses, libraries and legal aid, as well 
as government support for countless community-
based organisations, have been stripped down 
to the bare bones, abolished altogether or left 
to the vagaries of voluntarism and philanthropic 
giving.14 This rampant felling of services in the 
name of ‘austerity’, combined with cuts to a 
range of social security benefits and the failure of 
‘universal credit’ to streamline or strengthen the 
income safety net, have led to deepening poverty, 
widening inequalities and many thousands living 
in destitution. It was estimated in 2017 that more 
than 1.5 million people in the UK were ‘destitute’, 
meaning that they were unable to afford the bare 
essentials of life, including food and shelter.15
All this was noted by Philip Alston, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 
who visited the UK in 2018. For the purpose of 
this review, his most remarkable finding was that 
the changes were a result of a deliberate political 
campaign to alter the prevailing values of British 
society. The driving force was not economic, but a 
commitment to ‘radical social re-engineering’, said 
Alston. Funds were available to make life much easier 
for those living in poverty, but ‘the political choice was 
made to fund tax cuts for the wealthy instead.’16
There are now signs that the reaction against the 
values of Tawney, Beveridge and Marshall is waning. 
The idea of ‘austerity’ as a route to economic success 
has run its course and is now widely rejected by 
economists17 as well as by the public. As the Financial 
Times reported in September 2018, ‘British people 
are fed up with austerity’; two-thirds now say they are 
willing to pay more tax in return for more spending on 
health and education, representing the highest level of 
support for public services since 2002’.18 If this trend 
continues, the political climate may become more 
favourable for developing the case for UBS.
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CHAPTER THREE:
POTENTIAL 
BENEFITS OF UBS
Here we consider potential benefits of 
strengthening and extending public services, 
drawing on studies of existing services, across 
four dimensions: equity, efficiency, solidarity and 
sustainability.
EQUITY
 Public services are found to reduce income 
inequalities by providing a ‘social wage’ that is 
worth much more to people in the lowest income 
groups. In the absence of public provision, for 
people on low incomes meeting basic needs is 
likely to consume the majority of their income. If 
not, basic needs go unmet with negative impacts on 
individuals and society.19 A study of OECD countries 
found that poor people would have to spend three 
quarters of their income on essential services if they 
had to purchase them directly. Services reduced 
income inequality by an average of 20%.20
Modelling by the Institute for Global Policy found 
similarly that extending public services to new 
areas such as information and transport would have 
far greater value, proportionately, to low-income 
households than to rich ones.21
Services bring intrinsic benefits without which 
individuals and families are less likely to be able to 
meet their needs and flourish. Getting an education 
makes it easier to find work and earn money;  
access to healthcare means there is less risk of 
becoming disabled by illness and dependent on 
care; access to transport makes it possible to get to 
work and gain access to other services, and so on. 
The effects are not just individual: reducing 
inequalities will benefit society as a whole. 
As Wilkinson and Pickett have demonstrated, 
outcomes for a range of health and social problems 
(physical and mental health, drug abuse, education, 
imprisonment, obesity, social mobility, trust and 
community live, violence, teen pregnancies and 
child wellbeing) are significantly worse in more 
unequal rich countries.22
Some studies have shown that public services 
are more likely to benefit those who are better 
off than the poorest.23 Yet overall, there is strong 
evidence that public services benefit lower-income 
households disproportionately. A detailed analysis 
of the distributional effects of the social wage in the 
UK confirmed a consistent pro-poor bias in most 
services (higher education being an exception), 
which is borne out by more recent data from the 
ONS.24, 25 The ways in which universal services are 
designed and delivered – and how they interact 
with each other - are likely to influence the extent 
to which they benefit the poorest, as well as other 
income groups. 
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EFFICIENCY
Efficiency is usually measured in terms of the ratio 
between output and inputs: the greater the amount 
of useful output per unit of input, the more efficient 
the process is deemed to be.i Outcomes refer to 
the broader and longer-term impacts on individuals 
(such as poverty and mortality) or on social 
distributions (e.g. levels of inequality).26 They will 
be influenced by how services interact with each 
other, as well as by a wide range of social, cultural 
and economic conditions. Given these complexities, 
measures of efficiency in the public sector are 
usually complex and contested. 
Public services have often been accused of 
inefficiencies, which market theorists have linked to 
the vested interests of bureaucrats and professions. 
These shortcomings were used to justify introducing 
market rules into public services from the 1980s 
onwards. But competition between multiple 
providers, customer choice for service users and 
conventional cost-efficiency criteria for measuring 
success have largely failed to improve outputs let 
alone outcomes. These failings have been greatly 
exacerbated by public spending cuts, with decisions 
often predicated on the notion that simply reducing 
inputs is equivalent to increasing efficiency. 
Getting ‘more for less’ by cutting staff or increasing 
workload to compete in a quasi-marketplace has 
generally proved to be self-defeating.27
Market processes deliver inefficiencies in public 
services. Transaction costs are often higher for 
both consumers and providers. Public sector 
organisations can keep costs down in ways that 
cannot be achieved by competing commercial 
organisations – for example, through sharing 
administrative, purchasing and research functions, 
by avoiding duplication and by working together 
to achieve shared goals.28 Moral hazards are 
encountered when profit incentives combine with 
unequal knowledge in markets. For example, 
private medical providers have incentives to behave 
in ways that put others at risk by undertaking 
unnecessary medical interventions, while patients 
know too little to judge whether they are right or 
wrong.29,30 In addition – and crucially - a non-profit 
system does not need to extract funds to pay 
dividends to shareholders.
Turning to outcomes efficiency, there are further 
advantages to a public – rather than market-based 
- system of service provision. Where a range of 
collective activities are intended to serve the public 
interest, receive funding from public sources and 
share a democratic framework, they are, in theory 
at least, better able to interact in mutually beneficial 
ways – and they can be orchestrated to interact 
effectively by public authorities. An example is 
where schools encourage healthy eating and active 
pursuits, making people healthier and better able to 
benefit from clinical interventions; another is where 
high quality childcare helps children to get more out 
of primary education.
Definitive studies of the efficiency of public services 
are rare, and most that do exist focus on healthcare 
and cost-efficiency. A 2016 study for the Office 
for National Statistics compared spending on 
health care and average life expectancy in OECD 
countries. It found the USA, which is a mainly 
market-based system, outspent the UK by the 
equivalent of £6,311 per person, compared with 
£2,777, yet had an average life expectancy at birth 
of 78.8 years, compared with 81.4 in the UK.31
Other studies have found that, while the UK spends 
a smaller proportion of GDP on healthcare than 
other European countries, the NHS is regarded 
as the most efficient and cost-effective healthcare 
systems in the world.32 This is regarded as a 
‘vindication for the UK model of predominately 
publicly funded health (‘free at the point of use’ but 
funded mainly through taxation).33
Where efficiency is assessed in narrow output 
terms, calculations overlook the multiple 
dimensions of value, the many ways in which value 
is experienced and how it accrues. The concept 
of ‘social return on investment’ (SROI) has been 
developed over the last decade and adopted 
by government in the 2012 Social Value Act, 
which instructs public service commissioners to 
consider how to ‘improve the social, economic and 
environmental well-being of the relevant area.’34
i In public policy, inputs can refer to expenditure of resources, such as 
money or labour, as well as government regulation. Outputs refer to the 
implementation of legislation and the delivery of specific transfers and 
services, such as social care or health procedures.
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Applying social value analysis to an assessment 
of service efficiency means taking account of 
indirect as well as direct effects. For example, if 
staff delivering meals on wheels to people who are 
housebound take time to sit and chat with them, 
this may reduce their sense of social isolation 
and generally improve their wellbeing, but it will 
increase costs by demanding additional staff time. 
If a school opens up as a community centre at 
weekends, it may improve opportunities for local 
residents to get together and help each other in 
various ways with positive long-term effects, but 
it will also eat into the school budget. Some forms 
of social value take years to accumulate, with no 
immediate tangible benefits; often, they accrue in 
ways that do not return dividends of any kind to the 
organisation that made the investment in the first 
place. 
SROI has become a formula used to encourage 
private as well as public and third sector 
organisations to think about the ‘bottom line’ in 
public interest terms, and to seek innovative ways 
of achieving success. But market incentives tend 
to pull in the opposite direction for commercial 
organisations, except where achieving positive 
social outcomes directly boosts profits. When 
services influence and largely depend on the quality 
of human relationships, it is especially hard to 
square the circle. 
SOLIDARITY
The concepts of shared needs and collective 
responsibilities embody the idea of solidarity, and 
the practice of UBS (as we have defined it) arguably 
has potential to develop and strengthen solidarity. 
For this review, we take solidarity to mean feelings 
of sympathy and responsibility between people that 
promote mutual support. It is an inclusive process, 
not just within well-acquainted groups but also, 
crucially, between people who are ‘strangers’ to 
each other. It involves collective action towards 
shared objectives.35
As a policy goal, UBS calls for collective policy and 
practice: sharing resources and acting together to 
deal with risks and problems that people cannot 
cope with alone. It is not something that can be 
achieved by individuals or groups simply fending 
for themselves and pursuing their own interests. 
Society is not constructed simply through atomised 
choices spontaneously generating co-operation, but 
by mutual regard and consideration: people ‘cannot 
live together without agreeing and consequently 
without making mutual sacrifices, joining themselves 
to one another in a strong and enduring fashion’.36 
These things are not nice-to-haves, but the 
‘fundamental basis’ of social life.37
Pursuing the goal of more and better public services 
not only requires solidarity but also contributes to 
it – in three main ways. First, it develops experience 
of shared needs and collective responsibility, which 
can build understanding of how people depend on 
each other and a commitment to retaining these 
interconnections. Secondly, where services bring 
people together from different social groups, they 
can provide opportunities for developing mutual 
sympathy and responsibility. Thirdly, the combined 
effects of more and better services, as we have 
noted, bring benefits to society as a whole and have 
a redistributive effect, reducing inequalities which 
otherwise create barriers to solidarity. 
Some have argued that welfare states – and 
thereby public services - ‘crowd out’ social capital 
by inhibiting informal caring networks, mutual trust 
and social norms that favour civil commitment and 
trustworthiness. However, evidence contradicts this 
hypothesis, finding instead that Nordic-style welfare 
regimes, where there are more universal services, 
tend to have higher rather than lower levels of 
bonding and bridging social capital.38, 39, 40
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Much evidence and commentary relating to 
solidarity and public services focus how market-
based systems undermine a shared sense of 
interest and purpose, and how ‘calculations 
of individual self-interest diminish collective 
understanding and recognition of mutual need.’41 
Richard Titmuss famously demonstrated that a 
market-based blood donation service is likely to 
be less effective than a collective one based on 
voluntary donations.42 When nursery staff decided 
to fine parents who collected their children late, to 
encourage good time-keeping, parents interpreted 
the fine as payment for services and felt able to 
‘buy themselves out of their social contract’.43,44 
There is a rich literature on the ways in which 
neoliberal capitalism, based on individualism, choice 
and competition, weakens the values of social 
citizenship and undermines solidarity.45 
SUSTAINABILITY
Sustainability involves, at its simplest, an inherent 
‘capacity for continuance’.46 That suggests a system 
that can function in ways that continue to achieve 
its desired goals over time. UBS could have positive 
impacts on sustainability through prevention of 
harm, through economic stabilisation and through 
helping to mitigate climate change and the 
depletion of natural resources.
Depending on how they are designed and 
delivered, and how they interact with each other, 
public services can prevent harm. They are 
arguably better able to do this than market-based 
systems, because their aim is not simply to sell 
specific commodities, but to serve the public 
interest. When people are healthy and able to 
think for themselves and function well in society, 
they are less likely to have problems that require 
costly interventions. Good education and decent 
housing can help to avoid illness, for example.47 
Preventative services not only help people to stay 
well and flourish; they also preempt spending in the 
medium and longer term. They generally cost less 
than downstream interventions that try to cope with 
the consequences of harm.48 And they can reduce 
demand for a range of services, not just healthcare. 
Unemployment, anti-social behaviour and many 
forms of crime, for example, have roots in poverty 
and deprivation.49
Public services can help to stabilise economic 
fluctuations by generating relatively secure 
employment. And, while they are vulnerable to 
government austerity policies, they are not directly 
linked to downturns in the market. By acting as a 
counter cyclical buffer, helping to offset the effects 
of market cycles and recession, they contribute to 
the economy’s ‘capacity for continuance’. 
A move towards more and better public services 
is likely to prove more environmentally sustainable 
than a market based system. There is some 
comparative evidence that publicly funded health 
care has a lower carbon footprint than privately 
funded alternatives. For example, the US healthcare 
system directly accounts for 8 per cent of emissions 
in the US, compared with 3 per cent of UK 
emissions directly stemming from the NHS. This is 
due both to the greater macro-efficiency and lower 
expenditure shares of health in the UK, and to lower 
emissions per pound or dollar spent, presumably 
as a result of better allocation of resources and 
procurement practices.50
Public services perform important precautionary 
environmental and climate functions in their own 
right. The impact of Hurricane Katrina on the 
poor and black populations of New Orleans, in 
contrast to the population of Cuba, affected by the 
same hurricane, demonstrated the importance of 
collective services in dealing with climate-related 
risks. They are also better able to pioneer and 
support environmentally sustainable practices, 
for example energy and resource efficiency in 
social housing and other buildings, and supporting 
sustainable travel for staff, and are more likely 
to spread these out among a wider range of 
institutions. They are more ready to follow guidance 
and directives from government to reduce 
emissions, because they share public interest 
values. Finally, there is some evidence that welfare 
states are generally better suited to adopting and 
implementing pro-environmental policies, especially 
where they embody ideas about shared needs and 
collective responsibilities.51
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CHAPTER FOUR:
COMPLEXITIES 
AND CHALLENGES
UBS is a complex, multi-faceted idea, as we have 
noted. The term refers to collectively generated 
activities, funded or otherwise supported by the 
state, that enable people to meet their needs and 
are available to all according to need, not ability 
to pay. Since the goal of UBS is to strengthen 
and extend the range of services, much depends 
on how it is done in order to maximise equity, 
efficiency, solidarity and sustainability. In this 
chapter, we explore complexities inherent in the 
idea that point to options for meeting the challenge, 
and then engage with critiques of UBS that have 
been raised in the short space of time since the idea 
was first published.
MEETING DIFFERENT NEEDS
The most obvious complexity is the wide range of 
services that express collective responsibility for 
meeting shared needs. Education, healthcare and 
policing are obvious examples of existing services 
that are free to all. Childcare and adult social 
care can be seen as partly – and inadequately – 
included. Housing, libraries, legal aid and youth 
clubs were once included but are now residual or 
non-existent. Public transport services vary widely 
between areas and are sometimes free. Household 
utilities (water, sewage, energy, telephony) are 
regulated but not publicly funded. Other essential 
services such as roads and railways, street lighting 
and management of parks and leisure facilities are 
part of the picture. It is beyond the scope of this 
review to provide a full taxonomy.52
Here, we focus mainly on social - or what have 
been described as ‘providential’ -services, as 
distinct from ‘material’ services. These comprise 
‘(mainly) public-sector welfare activity providing the 
universal services available to all citizens’, rather 
than ‘the pipes, cables, networks and branches 
which continuously connect households to daily 
essentials’53 We are also interested in transport and 
information, which in our view span both categories. 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND POWER
There are multiple ways in which responsibility is 
exercised to ensure that services are accessible 
to all according to need, not ability to pay. The 
post-war settlement located responsibility with the 
state, so that services were provided directly by 
national or local government. Many services are 
now commissioned by government from private or 
third sector organisations. NGOs have sometimes 
stepped in to provide services abandoned by 
government. Responsibilities are thus spread out in 
various combinations, with government, commercial 
businesses, non-profit, charitable and voluntary 
organisations playing different roles in different 
settings. Meanwhile, members of the public who use 
or may need services are cast variously as clients, 
customers, consumers, partners or participants, 
signalling different functions and degrees of 
responsibility.54
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The traditional top-down model of public provision 
has been criticised for disempowering people 
who use services, discouraging civic and familial 
mutual aid, and encouraging dependence on the 
state. Advocates of market values, as well as some 
groups of services users, have claimed that people 
are empowered by exercising choice. However, 
experience has shown that, unless everyone 
has adequate information, skills and confidence, 
choice will only empower the better off and 
better educated. It has also shown that choice is 
often illusory because there is little or nothing to 
choose between. Meanwhile, some commercial 
organisations have amassed power by growing their 
share of contracted-out services, where regulation 
is too light or ineffective; some have come to enjoy 
monopolistic power.55
There is substantial support for devolving power 
to local areas. This ambition is shared by widely 
differing political tendencies. For those on the 
right, the aim is to shift responsibility away from 
the state to locally based charities, businesses and 
other non-government organisations, and to reduce 
state funding or withdraw it altogether.56 Around 
the political centre, ‘localism’ means shifting power 
from national to local government and boosting 
the capacity of councils to raise funds so that they 
can ensure that their residents’ needs are met – 
either directly or in partnership with other local 
organisations and residents.57
Communitarians and supporters of the ‘commoning’ 
movement want to encourage independent, local 
groups to take control of services, which they define 
and manage for themselves. Within these groups, 
there is a strong anti-state strand of politics, which 
sees government as part of the problem not the 
solution, and favours local self-determination and 
self-organisation as an alternative, rather than a 
market-based system.58 Others favour devolution of 
power to local areas and want much more control 
in the hands of residents than some protagonists 
of localism, but they seek to achieve this within a 
social democratic framework where the state retains 
three key responsibilities: to collect and distribute 
funds, to set and enforce quality standards, and to 
ensure equity of access.59
MODELS OF OWNERSHIP AND FUNDING
Beyond direct state ownership, there is a wide 
range of models for organisations providing 
services. These include multi-national corporations, 
small and medium-sized businesses, social 
enterprises, cooperatives and mutuals, user-led 
organisations, registered charities and community 
groups organised around neighbourhoods or 
shared needs and interest. Partnerships are often 
formed between public bodies and NGOs for the 
purpose of delivering services.60
Arrangements for resourcing services vary across 
the range of ownership models. Major public 
services are fully funded through taxation, with 
levels of funding varying according to government 
policy. In some cases, those who need the service 
must make a financial contribution and the level 
may be means-tested. Sometimes public funds 
are distributed to individuals as fixed payments or 
vouchers, which can be used to buy services they 
need or want (and can afford).61
In many cases, government bodies fully fund 
contracted-out services; they also give grants 
to third-sector organisations to enable them to 
undertake various activities and encourage them 
to raise further funds elsewhere. Businesses 
sometimes invest but only where they anticipate 
future dividends. Philanthropic giving is an 
increasingly important source of funds as austerity 
kicks in. Voluntary activity (unpaid labour) also 
provides substantial – and routinely undervalued - 
resources.62
17 18
DEGREES OF PARTICIPATION
Most providers these days have policies on user 
participation or personalisation, but the extent to 
which people actually participate in decisions about 
services varies widely. This ranges from receiving 
information and being consulted, to being actively 
engaged and co-producing services at the planning, 
design and delivery stages. Co-production involves 
users and providers of services forming an equal 
partnership and combining experiential and codified 
knowledge to develop ways of meeting needs. 
Advocates of ‘commoning’ envisage people taking 
control of identifying needs and the best way to 
meet them, as well as design and delivery. Co-
production and commoning challenge the very idea 
of a ‘service’, because they focus on people being 
part of the action to meet their own needs, rather 
than simply having services delivered to them - 
hence our reference to ‘activities’ rather than just 
services in our definition of UBS.63
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF UBS AND THE 
ROLE OF THE STATE
The quality and scope of collective activities – and 
how far they promote equity, efficiency, solidarity 
and sustainability - depend on how all these 
variables are combined and how they interact. 
Perhaps the most crucial factors are the ways 
in which people are engaged in designing and 
delivering activities to meet their needs, and the 
role of the state in distributing funds and ensuring 
standards and equal access.
Funding and participation are often interdependent. 
As Beresford observes, austerity has been a ‘poor 
bedfellow’ of participation, as policy makers pay lip 
service while implementing spending cuts. ‘Retreat 
from meaningful involvement impoverishes public 
provision, undermines accountability and creates a 
vicious circle of ever-diminishing engagement and 
support.’64
A positive relationship between locally generated 
activities and state institutions is all-important if 
the ‘vicious circle’ is to be turned into a virtuous 
one. This points to a new dynamic between 
‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ politics, and the need 
for significant changes to the culture and practice 
of public authorities. In a nutshell, public service 
professionals would need to encourage inclusive 
participation and local control, welcome innovation, 
facilitate diverse activities, actively support local 
organisations to meet quality standards, rather 
than simply police them, and distribute adequate 
resources equitably between different localities.65
CONDITIONALITY AND ENTITLEMENT
Inherent in the idea of a universal service (as distinct 
from a universal cash payment) is that access 
is conditional in that it depends on need. Who 
decides who needs what will vary from one service 
to another: eligibility may depend on professional 
judgement, locality or age, or on a claim by the 
individual – or a combination of these.
Assuming universality is country specific rather 
than global, who within the UK is eligible for access 
to services to meet their needs? Would eligibility 
derive from citizenship or from residence, or 
something else? Atkinson put forward the idea 
of entitlement based on resident participation,ii, 
66 which could be seen as ‘a move towards a 
reimagined social citizenship, based on plural 
identities and rights conferred on residents rather 
than on passport-holders’.67
The concept of UBS implies that eligible individuals 
have rights to activities that meet their needs. These 
are positive social rights to gain access to services, 
as distinct from negative civil and political rights, 
which usually involve freedom from various kinds of 
intrusion or harm. Social rights are strongly linked 
with the vision of social citizenship that underpins 
the post-war settlement, but unlike civil and political 
rights, they are not well established in UK law and 
would need further development. Equally important 
are ‘procedural rights’: systems and protocols that 
enable people to know and claim what they are 
entitled to by means that are fair, accessible, timely 
and affordable.68
ii Atkinson was considering eligibility for income support, but the concept 
can equally apply to services.
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COMMON FEATURES
Taking all these factors into consideration and 
looking across the range of possibilities suggested 
here for strengthening and extending UBS 
(education, healthcare, childcare and adult social 
care, transport, information and housing) we can 
see that mechanisms for design and delivery would 
be customised to suit the character and history of 
each service area. Transport services, for example, 
would be varied according to local geography and 
are less individually tailored than adult social care 
(at its best) – and so forth.
Yet there are certain features that should arguably 
be shared across all of them:
• collective responsibility for meeting shared 
needs, exercised through democratically elected 
governments; 
• accessibility and affordability for all, according to 
need not ability to pay;
• devolution of power to the lowest appropriate 
level (according to the principle of subsidiarity); 
• diverse models of ownership and control, with 
collaboration and partnerships within and 
between service areas; 
• meaningful participation by people who 
use or may need to use services, alongside 
professionals and other front-line workers, in 
decisions about design and delivery; 
• key role for the state in distributing funds and 
ensuring standards and equal access;
• clear rules and procedures for eligibility and 
entitlement.
CHALLENGES TO UBS
Because UBS has only recently been articulated 
as an option for public policy, there is so far very 
little direct challenge in the literature. Where it has 
begun to emerge, the challenges can be roughly 
summarised as follows. UBS would lead to big 
government, centralised power, paternalism and 
social engineering. The state is not competent to 
realise the vision. There is lack of clarity about how 
decisions would be made. It would lead to further 
accumulation by big business. It would be too costly 
to win support from the electorate and would run 
into strong resistance from those with an interest 
in the status quo. It is incompatible with capitalism 
and calls for radical transformation, not piecemeal 
reform.69 These are all valid points. As the authors of 
Foundational Economy rightly note, ‘the devil is in 
the detail’. 
The extent to which any UBS system enhanced the 
power of central government would be influenced 
by how far it adopted diverse models of ownership 
and by degrees of public participation. The state 
would be more or less competent to realise the 
vision depending on how far the development of 
UBS was accompanied by institutional learning 
and systemic change. A democratic framework 
for making decisions would be essential: one 
approach that may merit further exploration is 
‘a dialogue that combines lay people along with 
professionals (in service delivery, for example) and 
other experts, and with democratically elected 
representatives.’70 The challenge about maximising 
profits for big corporations could be met through 
tighter regulation and stronger commissioning 
criteria, as well as by making it easier for public 
bodies and other non-profit organisations to provide 
services. How far costs would meet voter opposition 
and resistance from current stakeholders would 
depend partly on whether changes were introduced 
incrementally, partly on voters’ attitudes to paying 
more taxes for public services (which as we have 
noted are more favourable now than they have 
been for some time), and partly on the political 
and economic environment in which changes 
were introduced. The question of whether UBS is 
incompatible with capitalism is worth asking but 
beyond the scope of this review.
There is clearly a great deal more work to be done 
to flesh out aspirations for UBS, its philosophical 
bases, costs and benefits, and the nuts and bolts of 
implementation.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
POTENTIAL FOR 
EXTENDING UBS
Here we explore the potential for extending the 
principles of UBS into new areas - childcare, adult social 
care, transport and information. Each field is complex 
and marked out from the others in multiple ways. 
5:1 CHILDCARE
THE CASE FOR UNIVERSAL CHILDCARE
The arguments for childcare being a shared need 
meriting collective responsibility are well rehearsed. 
There is strong evidence that childcare can have 
positive impacts on child development and longer-
term life chances, and on employment opportunities 
for parents, especially mothers.71 If it is accessible 
to all according to need not ability pay, it can help 
to reduce poverty and inequality, through direct 
and indirect effects over time on children, parents, 
families and wider society. Poor children and 
families have more to gain from it – and are more 
disadvantaged without it - than those who are better 
off.72 However, the extent of these benefits depends 
on the quality of childcare, and poor children and 
families are more adversely affected by poor  
quality care.73
The OECD points out that it is ‘part of society’s 
responsibility to educate children, to combat child 
poverty and to help children overcome educational 
disadvantage.’ It acknowledges a range of social 
benefits to individuals, which include better 
health, reduced likelihood of individuals engaging 
in risky behaviour and stronger ‘civic and social 
engagement’, with positive ‘spill-over effects’ for 
society as a whole.74
CURRENT COSTS AND PATTERNS OF 
PROVISION IN THE UK
Childcare is expensive and costs are rising. For the 
UK, the average cost of a part-time nursery place for 
a child under two rose by 7% from 2017-8, to £122 a 
week, or more than £6,300 a year, according to the 
Family and Childcare Trust.75
Some three and four year olds are entitled to up to 
30 hours free childcare. Some two year olds in low 
income families get 15 hours free childcare. Some 
parents are entitled to tax relief on childcare costs. 
Childcare subsidy through the benefits system is 
very complex and parents have to pay fees upfront 
and wait to be reimbursed.76
Childcare is provided by a mix of for-profit, public 
and voluntary organisations. Costs charged by 
providers vary across different parts of the UK. In 
most areas, the cost of full time childcare is higher 
than the upper limit for subsidy. Some providers 
reduce numbers of qualified staff, shorten opening 
hours or restrict availability of places to keep  
costs down.
Only half of local authorities in England and Wales 
have enough childcare for parents working full time; 
33 per cent of local authorities in England, 40 per 
cent in Wales, and 14 per cent in Scotland, do not 
have enough early education for three and four year 
olds eligible for the universal free entitlements.77
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QUALITY
Quality of childcare is generally lower in poor 
areas.78 There are no signs that quality is improving 
in step with rising prices, or that supply is sufficient 
to meet all families’ needs. Experts warn that, if the 
aim is to maximise social and economic benefits, 
there should be no trade-off between quantity  
and quality.79
The Women’s Budget Group (WBG) and the New 
Economics Foundation (NEF) have argued that, 
in order to achieve high quality care, training and 
salaries for childcare workers should be comparable 
to those of primary school staff. Both organisations 
support free universal childcare available to all 
from the age of six months or the end of parental 
leave to the start of compulsory schooling. They 
have calculated staff training and building costs for 
centre-based care and considered two scenarios 
– one with workers paid at levels equivalent to 
primary school staff, and the other with workers 
paid at or above the Living Wage.80 The most recent 
estimate finds that total gross costs amount to 
£55bn and £33bn respectively, representing 3% and 
1.8% of GDP. Offset by employment gains, increased 
tax revenues and reduced income support 
payments, annual net funding would be £6.1bn (a 
reduction of 89%) for the first scenario, and £1.7bn (a 
reduction of 95%) for the second. The WBG points 
out that these net costs are smaller than those 
incurred by a range of tax breaks introduced since 
2010 and fall far short of revenues lost through tax 
avoidance, which are conservatively estimated at 
£34bn a year. 
RETURNS ON INVESTMENT
These calculations only take account of immediate 
outcomes, while investment in universal childcare 
‘would certainly provide longer-term improvements 
in productivity for both the children and their 
parents as well as reduced spending on education 
(on remediation, etc.)’.81
Longer-term social and economic dividends have 
been estimated using Social Return on Investment 
(SROI) methodology. One such exercise forecast 
the impacts of a scheme in Cambridgeshire, 
where funded childcare was provided for 1,200 
disadvantaged two-year-olds. The cost over five 
years was £3,642,624; the estimated return on 
investment over the same period was £30,585,208, 
‘delivering a value of £8.40 for every £1 of 
investment.’82
FOR-PROFIT PROVIDERS
The role of for-profit providers has a bearing on both 
cost and quality, ‘because resources are siphoned off 
for shareholders rather than invested in staff wages 
and other quality inputs’.83 There is no evidence that 
competition between commercial providers drives 
down costs without impairing quality, while there is 
some evidence that state-maintained and voluntary 
sectors provide higher quality childcare than for-profit 
providers.84 Where for-profit provision is combined 
with a demand-led, fee-paying system, the observed 
effects are ‘a rise in the fees charged by providers, a 
drop in standards in poorer areas, and an increase in 
inequalities of access’.85
PARENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Parents meet the costs of childcare by paying fees 
and sometimes by making in-kind contributions. 
Where fees are concerned, there is clear evidence 
that free and universal services have much 
higher enrolment rates than services with a fee.86 
Means-tested systems encounter a range of risks, 
including stigmatising poor families, reducing 
uptake, inhibiting social mixing, and creating 
work disincentives for families who may forfeit 
entitlement if their earnings rise. Distilling lessons 
from eight OECD countries, Stewart et al point out 
that in Norway where childcare is universal, very 
high participation among younger children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds has been achieved 
by combining ‘a legal guarantee to a place for all 
children with fees that are both low overall and 
income-related’; however, ‘even low fees appear to 
deter access compared to free provision’.87
The Family and Childcare Trust promotes ‘parent-
led childcare’, which can help parents to access 
high quality care that ‘supports them to work and 
boosts their children’s learning, particularly in areas 
where parents are underserved by the childcare 
system.’ Parents can contribute by starting up and 
managing non-profit childcare, as well by carrying 
out ‘day to day tasks of delivering childcare to help 
keep running costs low’.88
21 22
NEF has argued for more parental involvement in 
childcare combined with shorter hours of paid work 
for all women and men. Assuming that parents 
spend the hours released from paid work looking 
after their children, NEF’s calculations show that 
reducing the standard working week to 30 hours 
could cut the overall costs of providing higher 
quality formal childcare by some 44%, from £37.5 
billion to £21 billion a year.89
These options suggest ways in which services could 
be more closely integrated with everyday family life, 
combining paid and unpaid labour to reduce the risk 
of high prices and low capacity locking poor families 
out of formal childcare, while enabling parents – 
especially including fathers – to spend more time 
with their children.
VOUCHERS OR SERVICES?
Government-backed vouchers for childcare were 
available to working parents until the scheme 
was closed to new entrants in 2018 having been 
described as a ‘shambles’.90 This voucher system 
offered tax relief as a partial subsidy for services. 
Vouchers can do little to iron out inequalities unless 
they are weighted in favour of low-income parents 
and extended to non-working parents. They help 
to generate and support a market in childcare. As 
we have noted, both means testing and for-profit 
provision have some negative impacts. 
DISTRIBUTION AND EQUITY
There is almost always a risk of disadvantaged 
parents finding it more difficult to gain access to 
quality childcare. NEF and Action for Children – 
among others - recommend that universal childcare 
be combined with targeted interventions for 
vulnerable families, such as outreach programmes 
to encourage take-up, higher income benefits and 
programmes to support parents.91 In addition, all 
childcare should be culturally sensitive and flexible 
to suit different working patterns. This approach 
is seen as preferable to restricting publicly funded 
childcare to disadvantaged children, in view of the 
many risks associated with selective and/or means 
tested provision, noted earlier. 
TOWARDS UNIVERSAL AND EQUITABLE 
CHILDCARE
Considering different ways of organising and 
funding a universal childcare system, what is the 
most promising combination of features to ensure 
that the effects are both equitable and positive 
for society as a whole? In brief, we suggest such a 
system would include:
• government regulation and support for well-
trained and adequately remunerated staff and 
well-equipped premises to ensure high-quality 
standards;
• additional targeted interventions to encourage 
take-up by disadvantaged families;
• adequate and continuing public investment, 
with full account taken of longer-term social and 
economic dividends.
• direct government funding through local 
authorities, with minimal fees or none;
• minimal or no involvement of for-profit providers;
• encouraging more in-kind parental contributions, 
combined with a shorter standard working week
5.2 ADULT SOCIAL CARE
THE CASE FOR UNIVERSAL  
ADULT SOCIAL CARE
Adults who are disabled, frail or vulnerable need 
care from others. That care is essential if they are 
to maintain their health and autonomy, and capacity 
for social participation. Close relatives often provide 
the necessary care, but in many cases they cannot 
do so – either because they lack the skills or 
resources, or because it impairs their capacity to 
meet their own needs. 
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On these grounds, secure, good quality adult social 
care should be available to all, regardless of ability 
to pay. It is a collective responsibility for dealing 
with risks that we all share across our lifetimes. 
The wellbeing of society as whole depends on its 
collective capacity to care for those who cannot 
look after themselves.
CURRENT CARE PROVISION
Numbers needing adult social care are growing 
rapidly, largely because people are living longer and 
many have multiple chronic conditions that intensify 
as they get older. Around 3.5 million older people 
currently need care with numbers projected to rise 
to 5.9 million by 2040.92 Services include a mix of 
home-based care services, day centres and full-
time residential care. What people need is almost 
infinitely varied, with different levels of intensity 
fluctuating over time. 
The adult social care system depends heavily on 
a huge cohort of informal carers who work unpaid 
to look after their relatives and loved ones. Around 
6.5 million carers in the UK provide care whose 
value has been estimated at between £57 and £100 
billion a year.93 Informal carers need varying kinds of 
support, too.
Services are provided by public, voluntary and 
private organisations, with for-profit companies 
rapidly growing their share of the care market. 
Some private firms go to the wall because financial 
pressures on local authorities mean they don’t pay 
enough for commissioned services; others make 
large profits – thanks in part to local government 
subsidies – even when standards of care are 
unacceptably poor. As one care-related charity put 
it: “We have seen company after company making 
millions whilst on the frontline vulnerable people 
are left without the basics to sustain life. Care staff 
are paid a pittance and asked to do the impossible 
with too few staff every day.”94 Concerns have 
also been raised about financialisation in the care 
sector, where private equity firms rush to acquire 
businesses that seem to promise rich returns, then 
run up debts that lead to closures.95
COSTS
The cost of a place in a residential care home varies 
widely by location, averaging at around £600 a 
week and £800 if you need nursing care. The cost 
of care in your own home also varies by location 
and depends on what you need, with the price of 
a carer at around £15-18 an hour and a hot meal 
costing around £4.50.96
Getting any of this paid for by government depends 
on a local authority assessment of needs, income 
and capital. If your capital is worth more than 
£23,250 you have to pay the full price yourself; 
if you have capital worth less than £14,250, you 
qualify for free care and in between you may get a 
partial subsidy. People needing care at home can 
claim an allowance from government, worth up to 
£85.60 a week, as can their carers, with eligibility 
based on need rather than income.97
In Scotland, unlike other parts of the UK, you get 
free personal care if you are over 65 and free 
nursing care at any age, if you are assessed and 
found to need it by your local authority.98
QUALITY AND DISTRIBUTION
Public policy has endorsed ‘personalisation’ in 
social care (as well as in healthcare), which is 
said to promote ‘choice and control… dignity and 
wellbeing…self-determination and self-direction’ 
and a relationship between those who work in 
and use services based on ‘based on respect 
and a recognition of equality’.99 This was in part a 
response to the disability movement’s campaign 
for more choice and control. It led to some people 
being given personal budgets or direct payments 
rather than services, to enable them to buy what 
they need from private or third sector providers. 
While personalisation is supposed to improve the 
quality of care, austerity policies are working in 
the opposite direction. Between 2010 and 2017, 
expenditure on adult social care fell in real terms 
by 5.8%, from £15.8 billion to £14.9 billion.100 The 
scope and cost of available social care vary widely 
between areas and quality has declined overall. The 
combined effects of spending cuts, rising demand 
and the pressures of contracting out to for-profit 
providers, have made it increasingly difficult for local 
authorities to fulfil the promise of personalisation or 
meet quality standards. 
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Deteriorating quality combined with means-tested 
state subsidies and increasingly strict assessment 
criteria mean that all but the rich struggle to get the 
care they need. Lower and middle-income families, 
except the very poor, can forfeit all their life savings 
and property values to pay for care. Workers are 
put under increasing pressure to do more for less, 
and people using services at home experience ‘lack 
of continuity, never seeing the same person twice 
[...] rushed visits—maybe quarter of an hour rushing 
in and out—with no time to establish a proper 
relationship, let alone real communication’.101
The government watchdog, the Care Quality 
Commission, warned in 2017 that adult social care 
in England was ‘approaching a tipping point’, driven 
by ‘a growing and ageing population, more people 
with increasingly complex conditions and in a 
challenging economic climate a greater demand on 
services but more problems for people in accessing 
care’.102 And things may well get worse: a funding 
gap between what’s required for adult social care 
and what’s available is expect to rise to more than 
£2.2 billion by 2020.103
LONG-TERM CARE IN GERMANY
Germany has a long term care insurance (LTCI0 
scheme featuring universal social rights within a 
strong cost-containment framework. The overall 
budget, contribution rates, ceilings, benefit levels 
and eligibility criteria are all fixed by Federal law. 
For those in work, employers pay half the premium 
while the retired pay full contributions, thus helping 
to address inter-generational equity concerns. LTCI 
membership is compulsory and non-employed 
people are covered by employed householder 
insurance contributions. The scheme acknowledges 
that long-term care is a social risk requiring social 
protection and has cross-party political support. 
After 25 years of operation, despite population 
ageing, an extension of the scope of LTCI, and 
increases in benefit levels, contributions have only 
increased by 0.8% of salaries.104
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Although adult social care is as much part of the 
‘social infrastructure’ as childcare, it can prove 
harder to argue the case for investment in terms 
of long-term social and economic dividends. 
Nevertheless, there are potentially multiple gains 
for society and for the economy. Good quality care 
services can improve the wellbeing of elderly and 
vulnerable people and their carers; they can help 
some family members who would otherwise be 
trapped at home to take paid work; they can enrich 
local communities by enabling more people to 
participate; they can prevent or delay conditions 
getting worse and needing more intensive 
interventions; they can help to reduce demand 
and free up beds in the NHS, which is estimated 
to cost the NHS around £3 billion a year.105 They 
can also provide secure rewarding paid work for 
professional carers and others employed in the care 
sector, with multiplier effects for the economy.106 
All these potential gains, together with the ethical 
case for looking after disabled, frail and vulnerable 
members of society, add up to a strong justification 
for investment.
MOVING TOWARDS UNIVERSAL, 
EQUITABLE AND HIGH QUALITY ADULT 
SOCIAL CARE
The challenge of how to achieve high quality 
services has dogged policy makers for several 
decades. There have been proposals, for example, 
to merge health and social care so that both are 
fully funded through taxation; to cap personal 
expenditure on social care at £35,000; to fully fund 
personal care (but not accommodation) through 
taxation; to recover care costs through inheritance 
tax down to the last £100,000; to introduce 
hypothecated taxation, and to raise extra funds 
through a ‘social care premium’ for employees over 
40, to which employers would contribute. None of 
these has been implemented.
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We suggest in summary that a system of adult social 
care that is universally accessible, high quality and 
equitable would: 
• give high priority to upstream preventative 
measures that enable people to stay well and 
independent for as long as possible;
• make a long-term commitment to public 
investment, with full account taken of the wider 
social and economic benefits;
• build a well-trained, highly valued and 
appropriately paid workforce;
• create a system that complements and supports 
- but does not displace - informal carers, 
recognising their value and working closely with 
them;
• use ‘personalisation’ as a route to empowering 
service users, not a vehicle for marketisation; 
• steadily reduce dependence on for-profit 
providers;
• make sure that contributions from people using 
services are transparent, fair and affordable, with 
public support funded through taxation to keep 
them at minimal levels for all;
• learn from other countries, e.g. Germany and 
Scotland.
5.3 PUBLIC TRANSPORT
THE CASE FOR UNIVERSAL,  
FREE BUS SERVICES
Mobility is essential for meeting basic human needs 
and attaining a reasonable standard of living.107 
If you cannot get from A to B, you cannot access 
healthcare and other services, find and keep paid 
employment, meet family and friends, and generally 
participate in society. People living in rural areas are 
far less likely to have access to public transport and 
often have to travel distances that are unsuitable for 
walking or cycling. People on low incomes spend a 
much larger proportion of their income on transport 
than those who are better off. They depend much 
more on public transport, and are affected more 
negatively if they cannot get access to it or find it 
unaffordable.
There is thus a case for transport being available 
to all who need it, regardless of ability to pay. 
Free local buses have been proposed as the best 
way to achieve this goal. There is also a strong 
sustainability case for universal buses, insofar as 
they discourage private car use and thereby help to 
reduce GHG emissions.
CURRENT PROVISION
Bus services are generally poor outside major 
conurbations. They are sparse or non-existent 
in many rural areas.108 They represent a small 
and declining proportion of all travel modes: 5% 
compared with 62% by car. Yet they remain the most 
widely use mode of public transport, accounting 
for 4,941 million passenger journeys, or 59% of 
journeys, compared with 21% by rail and the rest by 
underground, tram or light railway. 
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The UK deregulated local bus transport (outside 
London) in 1985, a move that marked it out from 
other developed countries. The idea at the time 
was to ‘encourage competition between a multitude 
of small private operators, with positive effects 
on public transport provision’, but the opposite 
occurred. After a brief flurry of over-provision and 
fierce competition, ownership consolidated so 
that by 2011 the four largest operators (FirstGroup, 
Stagecoach, Arriva and Go-Ahead) together had 
a 65% market share. Smaller operators were 
pushed out, along with unprofitable routes; poor 
interconnections between services and lack of inter-
ticketing made bus travel less convenient, while 
prices went up and government subsidies went 
down.109
All this amounts to a form of market failure that 
calls for more, rather than less public intervention: 
‘Providing high standards on the entire public 
transport network requires coordination and cross-
subsidies between different modes, routes and 
operations, and in a competitive market there is no 
incentive for operators to do so.’ 110 Attempts to re-
regulate bus services (outside London, see below) 
have so far failed, not least because they are locked 
in by powerful incumbents who benefit from the 
status quo and lobby against reforms.111
COSTS AND SUBSIDIES 
Most bus services are run on a commercial basis, 
but some are supported by local councils. Between 
2010 and 2018, government spending on supported 
bus services fell by 45%, from £3.9 million to £1.9 
million, and 3,347 bus routes were reduced or 
withdrawn altogether, with ‘dramatic impacts on 
accessibility for households without cars, notably in 
rural areas’.111, 112
Some bus travel is already free: at the last count 
there were 9.9 million concessionary travel passes, 
giving rise to 970 million bus journeys.114 The 
concession, which is for off-peak bus travel for  
older and disabled people, is protected by 
legislation but inadequately supported by national 
government. It has proved very popular but many 
councils have struggled to maintain the services. 
The Local Government Association warned: 
‘Unless the Government commits to fully funding 
concessionary fares, elderly and disabled people 
will be left stranded with a free bus pass in one 
hand but no local buses to travel on in the other’.115
Analysis for the Institute for Global Prosperity found 
that extending the concessionary bus scheme to 
the whole UK population across would cost around 
£5.2 billion and would be worth much more to low-
income families.116
TRANSPORT FOR LONDON
In Greater London, unlike anywhere else in the 
UK, a public agency, Transport for London (TfL), 
has strategic control, and contracts with private 
operating firms on the basis of quality as well as 
cost. This ‘natural experiment’ on the impacts of 
different models has produced clear results: while 
bus travel per capita rapidly increased in London 
over two decades, it declined everywhere else, 
including other metropolitan areas.117 Empirical 
studies across comparable countries show that 
public regulation is the norm and produces 
better results in terms of affordability and user 
satisfaction.118
EVIDENCE OF IMPACT
The state of bus services outside London has a 
strong negative influence on poverty and inequality. 
Low-income households without access to suitable 
bus transport have little option but to get a car, in 
spite of the cost. They typically have high levels 
of debt, and are unable to reduce their car use 
when fuel prices go up, piling on the economic 
stress.119 Without a car they are even more severely 
disadvantaged when there is no public transport to 
enable them to get to work, to access services or 
interact with other people. 
No less important is the fact that substituting cars 
for buses is ecologically unsustainable. Greenhouse 
gas emissions from use of cars and taxis is more 
than seven times higher than from use of buses.120
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Free bus passes have been criticised for ineffectual 
targeting because they include wealthy pensioners 
and exclude others in greater need such as 
unemployed people; and for lining the pockets 
private providers, with pass holders apparently 
accounting for 45% of bus operators’ revenues.121 
Some schemes have been found to displace 
active travel by foot and bicycle, although there is 
evidence that free bus travel encourages people to 
be more active because they get out more and walk 
to and between bus routes. 122,123,124
Overall, there appear to be more positive than 
negative impacts, especially when account is taken 
of social and other non-monetary effects. A 2016 
evaluation of the English National Concessionary 
Travel Scheme (ENCTS) concluded that the poor 
benefited disproportionately, that there were 
significant improvements in access to services and 
socialisation for pass holders, and that it increased 
their disposable income.125 In addition, there was 
found to be non-monetary social value, calculated 
at ‘£3.84 per return bus trip for concessionary travel 
pass holders and £8.17 for other bus users (in 2010 
prices)’.126
Analysis by KPMG for Greener Journeys found that 
free bus travel led to ‘substantial wider benefits, 
particularly health benefits from increased physical 
activity – as people taking public transport walk 
longer distances than people travelling by car, and 
improved labour market accessibility from improved 
service quality’.127
Another study found that mobility for older people 
brought multiple benefits, including increased 
independence, reduced isolation and improved 
health. It was both intrinsically good for older 
people and facilitated much of their contribution to 
society. Improving accessibility to public transport 
for older people would thus ‘be a good investment 
in a valuable asset’.128
A study of the impact of TfL’s free travel pass 
scheme has found that it successfully combats 
social exclusion by increasing the sense of 
belonging to the community and to London.129
For the public at large there are also positive 
impacts. A social value analysis of the impacts 
of local bus services found that the economic, 
social and environmental return for each £1 spent 
by government ranged from £2.00 to £3.80 for 
revenue expenditure and from £4.20 to £8.10 
for capital expenditure. Much depended on the 
nature of the intervention and local conditions, 
but it was nevertheless clear that ‘investment in 
local bus markets generates significant benefits 
to passengers, other road users and the wider 
community’.130
An econometric study by Leeds University 
found that a 10% improvement in local bus 
service connectivity in the 10% most deprived 
neighbourhoods across England would lead to 
increased income for more than 22,000 people; 
nearly 10,000 more people in work; more than 7,000 
more people attaining adult skills; a 0.7% increase 
in post-16 education; and 2,596 fewer years of life 
lost.131 
EXAMPLES OF FREE BUS SCHEMES IN 
OTHER COUNTRIES
Free public transport was introduced in the 
Estonian capital of Talinn in 2013. A study of the 
first year of the scheme found that public transport 
usage increased by 14% and the mobility of low-
income residents had improved.132 Studies of other 
free schemes in Belgium and Templin, Germany 
produced a range of useful insights. For example, 
where a goal is to reduce the use of cars, providing 
free public transport is not enough: there would 
also need to be strong disincentives for car users. 
Many people who made more use of buses would 
otherwise have walked or cycled: this reduced 
physical activity, but also reduced the volume of 
road accidents.133 In Templin, there was a huge 
increase in ridership, much of it by children and 
young people, referred to as ‘joy-riding by kids’ 
and suggesting increased opportunity for anti-
social behaviour.134 But this finding should be seen 
in relation to the study of young people in London, 
where bus journeys were seen as a valuable social 
experience that could also encourage physical 
activity between bus rides.135
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The city of Luxembourg is due to lift all fares on 
trains, trams and buses in 2020. It is known to suffer 
from some of the worst traffic congestion in the 
world, with 110,000 residents, a further 400,000 
commuting into the city to work and car drivers 
spending an average of 33 hours a year in traffic 
jams. The city authorities reportedly expect to 
save money on collecting fares and policing ticket 
purchases, but have yet to decide what to do about 
first and second-class compartments.136
MOVING TOWARDS FREE, UNIVERSAL 
BUS SERVICES
Overall, the evidence suggests that a combination 
of measures is required to maximise social, 
economic and environmental benefits of free, 
universal bus services. These include 
• adequate and sustained financial support from 
government
• strategic local control by public bodies, following 
the TfL model 
• regulation to ensure that bus routes are 
conveniently placed, well connected and regular, 
with adequate coverage in rural areas, as far as 
possible
• routes and schedules planned to facilitate social 
interaction and access to other services, not just 
shopping and employment
• restrictions on private motorised transport in 
urban areas.
5.4 INFORMATION
THE CASE FOR ACCESS  
TO DIGITAL INFORMATION  
AND COMMUNICATIONS
Smartphones and laptops are now considered a 
necessary part of household expenditure.137 The UK 
government is aiming to put as many of its services 
online as possible with a ‘digital by default’ strategy 
that is ‘so straightforward and convenient that all 
those who can use them will choose to do so whilst 
those who can’t are not excluded.’138 The United 
Nations recognises ‘the global and open nature 
of the Internet as a driving force in accelerating 
progress towards development in its various forms, 
including in achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals’.139 The EU has three strategic objectives 
for connectivity by 2025: ‘for Europe’s growth 
and jobs, Gigabit connectivity for places driving 
socio-economic 5G developments; for Europe’s 
competitiveness, coverage for all urban areas and 
all major terrestrial transport paths; for Europe’s 
cohesion, access for all European households to 
Internet connectivity offering at least 100 Mbps.’140
Going online enables people to get access to public 
services, to learn, to find work, to connect with 
family and friends, and to participate in society.141 
A systematic review of literature on unequal use 
of information and communications technology 
concluded that ‘considering how much public value 
it can create, it can be seen as a public good’.142 On 
these grounds and others it is argued that access 
should be for all, regardless of income or location.
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QUALITY AND EQUITY
Access to the Internet in the UK is extremely uneven 
across the country and often very poor in rural 
areas. While ‘rural communities are most in need 
of improved digital connectivity to compensate for 
their remoteness … they are least connected and 
included’.143 Telecommunications companies are 
not prepared to meet the high costs of covering 
greater distances and ‘rural areas are served last, 
if at all.’ Governments have allowed market failure 
‘by promoting the free market rationale and using 
competition as the instrument for improving digital 
connectivity, instead of defining new technologies 
as utilities’.144
Ensuring equity involves several factors: along with 
Internet connectivity; there is the speed and quality 
of the connection and the extent to which people 
are able and willing to make use of it. A 2018 survey 
found that 11.3 million people did not have basic 
digital skills, and 4.3 million had no digital skills at 
all. Age, gender and low income were the main 
predictors of low skills.145
In December 2018, the UK government announced 
its intention to bring in legislation to ensure that 
universal high speed broadband is delivered by 
a regulatory Universal Service Obligation (USO), 
giving everyone in the UK access to speeds of at 
least 10 Mbps by 2020.146 The spread, speed and 
quality of connection can only be distributed on 
an equitable basis through government regulation 
and – where markets fail – by governments 
taking control of provision. If strategies aimed 
at equipping people to maximise benefits from 
Internet connection are to be effective, they 
must be thoroughly inclusive, and must start from 
where people are, work with local knowledge 
and, where possible, put local people in control of 
development.147
COSTS AND BENEFITS
The costs of being connected are estimated to be 
£5 a week per household for broadband and £3.50 
a week per adult for calls. The overall aggregate 
cost of providing information services free at the 
point of use is calculated as between £16.5 billion 
ad £19.9 billion.148
ICT is seen as ‘increasing important for everyday 
tasks such as shopping, banking and booking 
medical appointments’. It is said to lead to ‘more 
efficient management of infrastructure and 
resources, and new business models.’ The UK 
government has been making 25 public services 
‘digital by default’, with the aim of making them 
simpler and faster to access. It estimates that 
digitizing services could save £1.7 billion a year.149 
A 15-year study of 35 OECD countries found a 
strong positive relationship between broadband 
investment and economic growth through 
information exchange, new services and telework, 
which together helped to increase GDP by an 
average of 0.38% annually.150
MOVING TOWARDS UNIVERSAL FREE 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS
In summary, establishing a universal service in this 
area would require:
• that it be recognised as a public good and 
treated as a utility rather than a consumer good.
• All other public services, including access to 
universal credit and other social security benefits, 
should be geared for use online in ways that are 
immediately accessible and convenient for all.
• Stronger regulation and government support 
aimed at equitable distribution of the spread, 
speed and quality of connection.
• Facilitation of locally generated initiatives to 
make access inclusive and to support appropriate 
learning, especially for those currently excluded.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This is a resource for the growing numbers who 
are showing interest in UBS from theoretical and 
practical perspectives. It is intended to scope out 
the territory, to identify issues and complexities, to 
bring problems and questions to the surface, and to 
stimulate further scrutiny, study and debate. 
The contents of this review do not amount to 
a definitive appraisal of the pros and cons of 
universal basic services. What is offered here is 
some analysis of selected literature on related 
subjects and discussions: there is very little on UBS 
itself, because little has yet been written on the 
topic. The Institute for Global Prosperity and the 
New Economics Foundation will continue working 
together and encouraging others to carry this 
forward.
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